Javier Milei in Argentina. José Antonio Kast in Chile. And most recently, Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia. 

In recent years, Latin America has experienced a sharp turn away from the “pink wave” of the 2000s and 2010s toward right-wing populism. To understand this strain of right-wing populism in Latin America, it is necessary to examine both the region’s current political systems and the issues that concern voters. Most presidential elections in Latin America are not decided during a first round of voting. This means most victors do not receive outright majorities when all candidates are on the ballot. The second round of these elections typically involves a runoff between the top two votegetters. Runoffs can be incredibly close: according to the BBC, Colombia’s 2026 presidential runoff was decided by one mere percentage point. 

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Latin American politics in the mid-to-late 20th century was characterized primarily by United States-backed dictatorships and widespread human rights abuses. In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America experienced an extreme increase in external debt. In response to this debt and the eventual fall of many of the dictatorships, neoliberal policies that aimed to reduce the debt became the regional standard. The neoliberal movement did help better the financial crisis. But in doing so, social programs were cut and public services were privatized. Poorer communities were hit especially hard by these cuts because they lacked a safety net, plunging many residents further into poverty. By the turn of the century, the political pendulum began to swing toward what became commonly known as the “pink wave.” Leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Lula da Silva in Brazil, and Evo Morales in Bolivia won office by promising to reverse those draconian cuts and expand social spending. 

Apart from a few rightward swings, the last 20 years have been mostly dominated by left-leaning governments. The few right-wing governments were usually followed by left-wing ones, thanks to voters who were angry with the conservative status quo. That same anger, however, has since turned against the left. So, why is the region experiencing such a strong shift toward the right? It largely boils down to three central issues: crime, the economy, and a thirst for anti-establishment movements.

Latin America has a homicide rate of 20.9 people per 100,000 people, well above the global average of 5.8 per 100,000. This is largely due to the prevalence of organized crime and drug cartels in countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Honduras. However, fears about security have risen in countries such as Chile and Costa Rica, hotbeds for tourists and ones that are generally considered safe. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, over 60% of voters in Mexico, Chile, and Costa Rica named security as a main concern during election season. 

In El Salvador, president Nayib Bukele has repeatedly turned to populist rhetoric, mano dura (hard-handed) policies, and questionable human rights decisions to decrease crime. El Salvador’s homicide rate in 2024 was 1.9 per 100,000, lower than the United States’ 2023 rate of 6.8. Now, however, the country has the highest incarceration rate in the world (see the nation’s CECOT prison, known globally for its human rights abuses). Right-wing leaders, drawing from Bukele, are putting forward plans to increase law enforcement presence, hoping it can improve the quality of life in their countries. Compared to the Left’s long-term plan to tackle the root causes of crime, voters primarily prefer the short-term solution through law enforcement. For example, according to the publication Foreign Policy, former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s strategy of tackling the root causes of crime in Mexico was followed by a dramatic rise in the national murder rate during his term. That said, critics of the Bukele model also note that El Salvador is considerably smaller than its fellow Latin American nations, and its comparatively weaker gangs may limit its efficacy in other scenarios. 

Globally, the cost of living has increased since the COVID-19 pandemic, and this has led to slower economic growth and increased inflation. The sluggish growth has coincided with the left’s dominance between 2018 and 2022, meaning voters have generally seen the left as the cause of the problem and have looked rightward for change. Argentina shows both the appeal and the risks of this turn: according to La Nación, inflation fell from 117.8 percent at the end of 2024 to 31.5 percent by the end of 2025 under chainsaw-wielding president Milei’s fiscal austerity, but poverty rose to 32.3 percent in the first half of 2026. Anti-establishment sentiment ties these two issues together, since weak parties and low trust in institutions let outsiders like Milei and de la Espriella win by running explicitly against the political class.

The forces behind Latin America’s shift towards the right can also be seen in Brazil’s elections. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president and currently-imprisoned Jair Bolsonaro, won about 47% of the vote in the first round. Meanwhile, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received roughly 45%. Recently, the United States has been looking to increase its influence in the region, and those efforts have been most successful under right-wing presidents who want the support of Donald Trump. Lula, however, has spoken out against President Trump, claiming in a television advertisement he is trying to “colonize” Brazil. Lula emerged victorious in the October 25 runoff, a massive sigh of relief for leftist politicians in South America. Lula’s victory proved the left’s resilience against a wave of conservative populism. Time will only tell, however, if this resilience begins—or ends—with Lula.